Pace University

DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications

School of Law

1-1-1982

Reexamining Federal Housing Programs in a Time of Fiscal
Austerity: The Trend Toward Block Grants and Housing
Allowances
John R. Nolon
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Housing Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John R. Nolon, Reexamining Federal Housing Programs in a Time of Fiscal Austerity: The Trend Toward
Block Grants and Housing Allowances, 14 Urban Law. 249 (1982), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/
lawfaculty/197/.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

Reexamining Federal Housing
Programs in a Time of
Fiscal Austerity: The Trend
Toward Block Grants and
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University of Michigan Law School (1966);
Former Professor of Urban Studies,
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I. Introduction

SEVERAL
RECENT ACTIONS at the federal level represent a fundamental shift in the role that the nation's highest level of government will play in pressing for "a decent home and suitable living
environment for all Americans."' Congress acted in 1981to reduce
federal spending for housing by nearly 50 percent and to shift the
emphasis of federal programs to subsidies for existing housing
rather than for the construction of new housing units.' In October
*Portions of this article were prepared for an Information Bulletin to be
published by the Urban Consortium for distribution to the chief executives of the
nation's largest cities and urban counties.
1. Housing Act of 1949,42 U.S.C. 8 1441 (1976). The declaration of national
housing policy contained in Section 2 of the National Housing Act of 1949
provides an apt preface for this article and an interesting counterpoint to recent
federal housing activity:
The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare and security of the
Nation and the health and living standards of its people require housing
production and related community development sufficient to remedy the serious housing shortage, the elimination of substandard and other inadequate
housing through the clearance of slums and blighted areas, and the realization
as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family, thus contributing to the development and
redevelopment of communities and to the advancement of the growth, wealth,
and security of the Nation.
2. Housing and Community Development Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-35,95 Stat. 384 (1981). This legislation, signed by President Reagan on Aug.
13,1981, provides funding of $18.087 billion for 156,250units of assisted housing.
This contrasts with Pub. L. No. 96-526,94 Stat. 3044 (1980), signed by President
Carter on Dec. 15,1980, which provided $30.87 billion for 280,000 housing units.
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of 1981, The President's Commission on Housing recommended
"that the primary federal project for helping low-income families
achieve decent housing be a consumer-oriented housing assistance
grant.") Simultaneously, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) proposed radical changes in
its legislative program for fiscal year 1983; HUD recommended a
sharply reduced subsidized housing program that would eliminate
three housing rehabilitation programs and replace them with a
block grant, establish a direct rental subsidy program for the poor,
and provide a very modest new construction program for the
e l d e r l ~These
. ~ actions contrast markedly with the federal housing
programs of the 1970s and early 1980s. For fiscal year 1981, for
example, Congress approved funding for 280,000 assisted housing
units, fully half of which were to be newly constructed or substantially rehabilitated h o u ~ i n g . ~
The federal government's changing role in housing parallels a
change in federal spending for many other domestic program^.^
These changes represent a shift in the course of the federal system,
centered on the national government's power to tax and to spend
public funds for the general welfare.
This article begins with an examination of the evolution of the
federal government's predominant role in collecting and spending
revenues for social programs, including housing. It traces the
growth of federal spending, and the evolution of federally assisted
programs for housing. It continues with an analysis of the trend
toward block grants and housing allowances, and concludes by
commenting on this trend's effect on the future of housing programs for households with limited incomes.
11. Evolution of the Federal Power to

Collect and Spend Revenues for
the General Welfare

Article I , Section 8 of the United States Constitution gave Congress the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
3. THEPRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION
ON HOUSING,
INTERIM
REPORT,
at p. 3 (1980).
4. HUD Transmittal of its Legislative Program for the 97th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
forwarded to the Office of Management and Budget by Donald I. Hovde, Acting
Secretary (Sept. 15, 1981).
5. Pub. L. No. 96-526, 94 Stat. 3044 (1980).
6. In 1981, Congress designed block grant legislation to consolidatecategorical
programs in the health, education, and social services fields. These programs
generally reduce the level of federal assistance available, transfer greater authority to state governments for the administration of the programs, and reduce
federal regulation of the programs.
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excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and
general welfare of the United States." The Founding fathers hotly
debated the meaning of the Section 8 general welfare provision.
Jefferson and Madison argued that the power to tax was limited to
promoting the general welfare under powers specifically granted
by other clauses of the Constitution. Their view of the federal
government, as one of enunciated powers, suggested that Congress could not tax and spend for just any broad general welfare
purposes that it might choose to promote.' Hamilton disagreed.
He held that Congress could tax and spend for the general welfare
as defined by Congress i t ~ e l f . ~
This debate over the meaning of Article I, Section 8 continued
for over a century and a half until it was decisively resolved by the
Supreme Court during the New Deal.9In upholding the constitutionality of the Social Security Act, the Court adopted the Hamiltonian view that the Constitution's grant of power to Congress to
spend for the general welfare was broad, and not narrowly limited
to the furtherance of specific, enumerated powers. The Court also
defined the general welfare power as flexible and changing, rather
than fixed by the framers of the Constitution: "Nor is the concept
of general welfare static. Needs that were narrow or parochial a
century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of
the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time."1°
This dynamic view of the spending power was essential to the
ability of Congress to enact the sweeping social programs that were
initiated in the post-Depression period. At issue was the federal
government's authority to raise and distribute resources to solve
problems that had previously been regarded as local rather than
national in scope. Even Hamilton had agreed that the powers of
taxation and appropriation extended only to matters of national,
as distinguished from local, welfare. This view was reinforced by
commentator Story who wrote: "The Constitution was, from its
very origin, contemplated to be the frame of a national government, of special and enunciated powers, and not of general and
unlimited powers."11 In Helvering, the Court concluded that the
several states could not deal effectively with problems such as
relief for the elderly and unemployed.
7 . See THEFEDERALIST
NO.41 (J. Madison); T. JEFFERSON,VIRGINIA
PROTEST
(1825).
8. See THEFEDERALIST
NO. 35 (A. Hamilton).
9. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1935).
10. Id., at 641.
1 COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED
STATES,
11. J. STORY,
§ 909 (5th ed. 1891).
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State and local governments are often lacking in the resources that are necessary to finance an adequate program of security for the aged. . . . Apart from
the failure of resources, states and local governments are at times reluctant to
increase heavily the burden of taxation to be borne by their residents for fear of
placing themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as compared to
neighbors or competit~rs.'~

The Great Depression, the Roosevelt Administration, and cases
like Helvering v. Davis set the stage for the creation by Congress of
housing programs for low-income Americans. Prior to Helvering,
Congress had limited its actions in the housing field to programs
designed to strengthen credit institutions and make mortgage
financing available to a larger number of home buyers.
In a major departure, two years after the Helvering decision,
Congress created the Public Housing Program for low-income
tenants. The 1937 United States Housing Act made available
direct federal subsidies to allow local governmental bodies to
develop, own and manage housing for low-income people and to
encourage the replacement of slums with newly constructed
housing.13This post-Depression housing legislation was motivated
as much by a desire to create jobs in a fragile economy as to provide
shelter for those in need. Both purposes, however, would have
withstood the judicial test for determining whether Congressional
legislation properly pursued the nation's general welfare. In fact,
in no case to date has the Supreme Court held any federal grant
program unconstitutional for pursuing a local purpose, rather than
the national welfare.
A recent Supreme Court ruling illustrates the extent to which
Congress can go in funding local projects, in the interest of the
national welfare. In Fullilove v. Klutznik,14the Court held constitutional the grant of federal monies for local public works projects,
under the Public Works Employment Act of 1977. The Fullilove
case describes a federal government that for practical purposes,
seems complete and without limitation in its power to tax and
spend for the general welfare. The housing programs that have
emanated from Congress, beginning with the 1937 U.S. Housing
Act, are illustrative of the extent to which the federal government
has been willing to spend public monies to assist local programs in
pursuit of "national" general welfare objectives.
12. Id., at 8 644.
13. United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. 88 1401-30 (1976).
14. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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111. The Evolution of Federally

Funded Housing Programs

As Congress considers enactment of the sweeping changes envisioned by the recent recommendations of HUD and the President's Housing Commission, it will be deciding where next to turn
on a path it has been travelling for over fifty years. Congress began
during the fiscal crisis of the early 1930s by creating the Home Loan
Bank System, establishing a system of deposit insurance, and
creating a secondary market for mortgages threatened with
forecl~sure.'~
It continued its concern for the mortgage market by
passing the National Housing Act of 1934 which established a
system of mortgage insurance through the Federal Housing Administration. This Act had the effect of liberalizing private mortgage credit terms and greatly spurred housing construction by
making long-term, low down-payment mortgages available. The
Act also created secondary market facilities for purchasing government insured mortgages and returning capital to originating lenders for additional mortgage lending.
It was against this backdrop that Congress acted in 1937 to create
the Public Housing Program. Twelve years later, Congress created
a separate slum clearance initiative that became known as the
Urban Renewal Program.16Under the Housing Act of 1949, Con-

--

- - - - -

-

-

-

-

-

15. In 1931, President Hoover convened the White House Conference on
Home Building and Homeownership to look into the emerging crisis in mortgage
lending. At the time, there was little unanimity of opinion over whether government should intervene. In 1932, the Home Loan Bank System was created; by
that time, symptoms of financial collapse has spread throughout the home lending
market. Through regional banks, the Home Loan Bank Board was authorized to
make loans to member savings and loan institutions which, in time, were required
to invest heavily in real estate mortgages. Later, a system of deposit insurance was
established, restoring public confidence in banking institutions. This early housing-related legislation was borne out of national calamity and went far toward
revitalizing and reshaping the system of mortgage credit and home insurance that
had been in use.
In an ironic parallel a half-century later, President Reagan's Commission on
Housing called for an extensive restructuring of the home financing system to
ensure that adequate funds are available for residential lending. In a draft
position paper entitled Financing the Housing Needs of the 1980s (issued January,
1982), the Commission noted that the changes needed today may be as widespread as those made during the Roosevelt Administration that enabled savings
and loan associations to become the primary source of home mortgage lending.
The Commission reported that "a broader based and more resilient system of
housing credit is needed to finance the housing needs of the 1980s." It recommended giving broader powers to thrift institutions so they can offer checking
accounts to business, invest more widely in consumer, commercial and agricultural loans, and expand their real estate activities.
16. Housing Act of 1949, Title I, 42 U.S.C. 5 1441 (1976).
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gress provided direct subsidies to local governmental agencies to
allow them to clear blighted areas and provide sites at economically feasible prices for private enterprise to build moderate cost
housing and other commercial, industrial and public facilities. The
Housing Act of 1954 added conservation and rehabilitation programs to broaden urban renewal into a more comprehensive tool."
Local governments were also required, beginning in 1954, to adopt
master plans and a variety of local codes, to remain eligible for
urban renewal subsidies.
In 1959, Congress extended the availability of housing subsidies
to nonpublic entities for the first time. The Housing Act of 1959
created the Section 202 Program, providing direct loans to private,
nonprofit entities to develop housing for the elderly and
handicapped.'* Congress first provided these loans at the interest
rate then paid on the federal debt, but later wrote the rate down to
three percent. This was the first congressional expression of the
need for direct subsidy to accommodate households with incomes
above the public-housing level.
The momentum picked up with the Housing Act of 1961, which
created the Section 221(d)(3) Below Market Interest Rate
Program.Ig For the first time, private developers were made eligible, along with nonprofits and cooperatives, for direct federal
loans; interest rates were established by the amount paid on the
federal debt. In the Housing Act of 1965, Congress allowed subsidies to be geared to individual family needs for the first time; the
Rent Supplement Program was created, under which eligible
tenants paid no more than 25 percent of their income for rent and a
flexible federal subsidy covered the difference ." In 1965, Congress
also created the Section 23 leasing program enabling local public
housing agencies to subsidize units in existing h~using.~'
That same
year HUD was created as a new cabinet-level agency. In 1966,
Congress created the Model Cities Program, an attempt to coordinate physical improvement activities with social programs in
defined neighborhoods.*
17. Housing Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 9 1450 (1976).
18. Housing Act of 1959, 12 U.S.C. 9 1701q (1976 and Supp. I11 1979).
19. Housing
. . (6),
. . 75 Stat. 149, 150
- Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, 9 101(a)
(1962).
20. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, Title I, Pub. L. No. 89-117,
79 Stat. 451 (1966), 12 U.S.C. 9 1701s (1976).
21. Id., at 5 103(a), 79 Stat. 451, 455119661.
22. Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, Title I,
42 U.S.C. 99 3301-3313 (1976).
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A half century of federal housing legislation was combined and
significantly expanded in the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968.= Congress created the Section 235 Program, under
which subsidies were made available to enable lower income families to purchase homes." The 1968Act also created the Section 236
Program to provide rental housing for families whose incomes
exceeded public housing eligibility limits.15Under Section 236, an
interest subsidy was provided; HUD could write the interest on the
mortgage down to one percent. The Neighborhood Development
Program was also created in 1968, giving a new slant to Urban
Renewal by encouraging steady, more flexible, and comprehensive performance under Urban Renewal programs.26In addition,
the 1968 legislation also extended and expanded Model Cities,
Urban Renewal, and a variety of other grant-in-aid programs and
authorized large appropriations for Rent Supplements and Public
Housing.
With this new legislation, private developers were fully enfranchised by Congress. The flow of federal housing subsidy funds
was henceforth to be triggered by applications from private sector
developers, except for public housing projects, which remained
within the control of local housing authorities. Local renewal and
redevelopment agencies worked in partnership with private developers providing sites and public improvements and otherwise
aiding project feasibility in urban renewal areas. Outside renewal
areas, the ground rules were much less clear. Local governments
often initiated the process whereby private developers applied to
HUD for housing subsidies. Frequently, however, localities found
themselves responding to unsolicited initiatives by developers to
build low- and moderate-income housing with federal assistance.
The Nixon moratorium on housing programs and runaway inflation in the early 1970s spurred a reexamination of federal development and housing programs and led to the passage of greatly
revised legislation in 1974. The Housing and Community Development Act of that year eliminated most categorical urban development programs, including Urban Renewal, and replaced them
with a community development block grant for eligible localities
. ~ Act provided for the phasing out of most
and urban c o u n t i e ~The
23. Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968).
24. Id. at 477.
25. Id. at 498.
26. Id. at 518.
.
27. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383,
88 Stat. 633 (1976).
~

-~

~~~

-
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current housing subsidy programs and created the new, highly
flexible Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments P r ~ g r a m . ' ~
The Housing and Community Development Act required localities to develop a Housing Assistance Plan (HAP) as a part of their
application for Community Development Block Grant assistance.
These HAPS were then to be used by HUD in allocating housing
subsidies and in reviewing developers' applications; all such applications were to be referred to the local chief executive for review
and comment regarding whether the application was consistent
with the municipality's HAP. While this procedure gave local
officials a greater degree of control over the construction of federally assisted housing, the private sector was still heavily relied on to
initiate applications for new construction and substantial rehabilitation projects.
Section 8 was not just a new construction and substantial rehabilitation program. Local public agencies were made eligible to
apply for set-asides of Section 8 units to subsidize the rents of
tenants in existing housing complying with local housing standards. This Existing Section 8 Program was later expanded to give
these local agencies set-asides of Section 8 funds, with higher
allowable rental levels, to enable the owners of rental housing to
complete a moderate level of rehabilitation. Under this program,
local housing authorities and other eligible public agencies became
the vehicles through which applications were made to HUD for
housing assistance to subsidize rents and effect moderate rehabilitation in existing housing. The expansion complemented the localities' recently acquired authority to use their Community Development Block Grant funds to initiate rehabilitation loan and
grant programs to stimulate the preservation and revitalization of
privately-owned homes and rental housing and to launch neighborhood preservation programs in both residential and commercial areas.
In designing the Section 8 new construction and substantial
rehabilitation program, Congress was attempting to provide a
subsidy sufficiently deep and flexible to respond to double digit
inflation. An alarming number of Section 236 projects had become
financially troubled because the interest subsidy employed by the
program was simply not flexible or deep enough to keep pace with
rapidly rising energy and maintenance costs. Under Section 8,
Congress agreed to pay the difference between 25 percent of a
28. Id. Title 11, 8 201(a).
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tenant's income and rents designed to respond to actual market
conditions. The flexibility of Section 8 allowed avoidance of the
cost overrun problem of Section 236, but caused increasing anxiety
in Congress as costs continued to escalate, increasing the federal
contribution and building pressure on the legislators to look for
alternative subsidy mechanisms such as the Housing Block Grant
and Housing Allowance approaches.
IV. Reexamining Federal
Housing Programs

By 1980, these federal housing programs had become sufficiently
controversial to inspire Congress to order a comprehensive examination of the feasibility of a housing assistance block grant
program. Congress stipulated that the examination, to be conducted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
study the feasibility of replacing the current federal housing programs with a block grant for housing.29The order reflected a
congressional response to heightened criticism of the current programs as too costly, overly complex and too highly regulated.
Congress sought to investigate other alternatives that would give
localities greater flexibility, lower the cost of housing assistance,
and simplify the method of administering the program. Under a
block grant method of distributing federal housing assistance,
municipalities and other recipients of block grant funds would play
a greatly increased role in planning and implementing programs
for the construction, rehabilitation, and maintenance of low- and
moderate-income housing.
Housing block grant legislation would signal a fundamental shift
in the attitude of Congress as to how some or all federal housing
programs are to be administered. The degree of federal prescrip. tion would be lowered, administrative control loosened, and the
allocation of funds made more directly to local and state governments. The significance of a shift to housing block grants can be
illustrated by a review of two recent proposals to use block grants
as the method of delivering federal housing assistance.
A. Housing Block Grant Proposals of the 1970s
Two formal proposals to create a housing block grant program
emanated separately from Congress, in 1973, and from the Ford
29. Housing and Community Development Act of 1980, Title 11, Pub. L. NO.
96399, 9 215, 94 Stat. 1614, (1980).
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Administration in 1976. These two proposals had a great deal in
common. House Report 10036, commonly known as the BarrettAshley proposal, and a report prepared by HUD Secretary Carla
Hills shared these basic notions concerning housing block grants:
1. Funds would be allocated to local governments and to states
based on a statistically measurable formula.
2. Large cities and urban counties would be entitled to receive
allocations directly, with funds for smaller jurisdictions being
separately allocated either through state governments or by
HUD.
3. Applications for housing funds would be simplified, federal
reviews of the application narrowed, and emphasis placed on
performance reviews.
4. Funds could be used for virtually all types of housing subsidy
payments, with an emphasis on the housing needs of lower
income households, and with responsibility for planning and
administering housing programs centered at the local and
state level.
5. Compliance with other federal statutes such as fair housing,
civil rights and environmental legislation would be required.
These common characteristics spring from the underlying nature of block grant legislation, and, with minor deviations, are
likely to appear in most housing block grant proposals. Basic to the
block grant concept are the elimination of undue federal interference in local decision making and the reduction of the difficulties,
delays, and costs inherent in federal processing. These refinements
will in turn result in greater flexibility at the local level in program
design, greater local responsibility for the success of individual
projects, and the hope of achieving greater efficiency through the
coordination of federal, state, and local resources.
As likely as these characteristics are to appear in housing block
grant legislation, there are several major issues about which there
is little historical or conceptual agreement. Most significant of
these is the specific method of allocating funds to the local or state
level.
B . The Allocation Dilemma
The Barrett-Ashley proposal was based on direct allocations of
entitlement amounts to local and state governments. It authorized
entitlement communities to use a certain percentage of their projected annual allocation for outlays in the current year. It left the
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locality free to choose to make short- or long-term commitments of
block grant funds. Multiyear commitments could be made to secure long-term financing required for new construction and substantial rehabilitation, subject to certain limitations controlling the
amount of deferred payments in any one year. The administration
in 1973 opposed the Barrett-Ashley proposal because of its
"emphasis" on new construction; it suggested instead greater consideration of direct cash assistance and allowances. The 1976 Hills
proposal was also based on the direct allocation of an entitlement
amount to local and state governments. Hills would have used the
newly evolved concept of "budget authority" to provide the longterm commitment of funds necessary to insure the financial success
of programs over time.
The concept of budget authority is basic to a full understanding
of the dilemma that faces Congress in deciding how best to allocate
housing block grants. In 1974, Congress required, for the first
time, that HUD include in its budget submissions the cost of
assisted projects over the full life of the federal government's
. ~ long-term budget aucommitment to provide a s s i s t a n ~ eThis
thority resolved the long ignored issue of how subsidy commitments were to be guaranteed. Prior to 1974, HUD had simply
requested contract authority to meet obligations under subsidy
commitments that fell due in any given year. Today, HUD is
required to include in its budget both the authority that is needed
to pay the long-term costs of housing assistance contracts to be
awarded during the fiscal year, as well as the amount of contract
authority that is to be expended during that fiscal year. Under any
housing block grant program, Congress must then decide how
much budget authority to allocate to eligible recipients, the length
of that budget authority, and the amount of contract authority (as a
percent of budget authority) available in any given year.
The 1976 Hills proposal recommended that the housing block
grant authorization legislation specify the amount of budget authority that would become available at the beginning of each fiscal
year. It further recommended that congressional appropriations
release budget authority for three years and make that authority
available to localities until expended, up to fifty-five years. The
Hills proposal would have set an upper limit on annual contract
authority allocated to a locality; only this amount could be spent in
30. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Title IV,31
U.S.C. 5 1301 (1976).
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any given year. This would allow, but not require, localities to
expend their three year budget authority in no fewer than ten
years.
Hills reasoned that this technique would create an incentive for
localities to develop projects for the subsidy or repair of existing
housing, rather than new construction or substantial rehabilitation. Existing housing programs have lower per unit cost, require
shorter contract terms, and allow localities more latitude to use
fully their maximum annual spending allowances. The longer term
contracts required for financing new construction and substantial
rehabilitation would require localities to spread their available
budget authority over a longer period than the ten-year minimum;
this would tend to discourage localities from using their allocations
for these longer term commitments.
The Hills proposal was advanced toward the end of the Ford
Administration. It was criticized by the Office of Management and
Budget as preempting a discussion, under broader welfare reform
proposals, of the prospects of meeting the housing needs of the
poor, partially or completely, through a cash transfer system. This
criticism, other technical difficulties, and the defeat of President
Ford combined to curtail discussion of the Hills block grant recommendation. The Hills proposal received considerable reexamination after Governor Reagan's election in 1980 and his appointment
of former Secretary Hills to chair his transition housing policy task
force, and subsequently to serve as the Vice Chairman of his
Housing Commission.
As Secretary Hills candidly admitted, the method she recommended of allocating budget and contract authority tended to
favor the use of federal housing funds for maintaining and revitalizing existing housing. The Barrett-Ashley allocation mechanism
was criticized as being too oriented toward new construction.
These proposals illustrate the difficulties that face Congress in
addressing the threshold issue of how to allocate federal spending
authority to lower levels of government. They also demonstrate
how the allocation method chosen by Congress tends to bias a
block grant program in favor of one set of housing programs over
another.
V. The Various Designs of a
Block Grant for Housing

Out of the dilemma that is built into the allocation mechanism have
evolved four separate program models, distinguishable primarily
H e i n o n l i n e - - 1 4 Urb. L a w .
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by the method each uses to allocate housing assistance, and by
what, and how much, each proposes to allocate.
1. Short-Term, All Purpose Grant. Under the first program
model, only short-term authority would be allocated to block grant
recipients, which they would then be authorized to spend immediately. Such authority tends to encourage housing programs
that require short-term contractual commitments, such as onetime land acquisition or capital grants, one-to-five year interest
reduction arrangements or rental assistance contracts, or one-time
interest reduction payments. As an all purpose grant, it is generally
intended to replace all other federal housing assistance programs
and to give recipients great control over the shape of local programs. Short-term authority can be converted to long-term commitments to support new construction and substantial rehabilitation; however, localities would be discouraged from making such
commitments because they require the use of all, or a substantial
portion, of the grant to support a relatively few units.
2. Long-Term, All Purpose Grant. The 1976 Hills proposal fits
this second model; it proposes the allocation of long-term budget
authority to block grant recipients for use in a wide range of
housing activities. Long-term authority more easily allows for
payment of debt service over a longer period and is equally adaptable to a range of shorter term uses. This model usually carries an
arbitrary ceiling on annual contract authority to limit the amount
for which the federal treasury will be obligated in any one year. As
illustrated by the Hills proposal, this annual contract authority
ceiling can be manipulated to encourage localities to favor one
type of housing activity over another.
3 . Allocation of Budget Authority Under Current Programs.
This model suggests that current federal housing programs be left
in place as designed by Congress. A formula could be used to
allocate to recipient jurisdictions their share of budget authority;
they could then design housing strategies by choosing from full
range of HUD programs. This transfers full control over program
selection and mix to the local or state level, while Congress and
HUD retain responsibility for program standards.
4. Limited Purpose Block Grant. This final model would terminate fewer of the existing federal subsidy programs, and use a
limited purpose grant to allow recipients greater flexibility to design replacement programs. Proposals in this category normally set
their sights on HUD's traditional rehabilitation programs and
recommend their replacement by a Housing Conservation Block
Grant or Rehabilitation Block Grant Program. These proposals
Heinonline - - 14 Urb. Law. 261 1982

illustrate the relative nature of the block grant concept. By proposing to replace a smaller group of federal housing programs, they
are less "blocky" than full-purpose grants in proportion to the
number of initiatives they supplant. The limited purpose approach
is often suggested as a method of making the transition to a
full-purpose model. Limited purpose grants can, of course, be
either long- or short-term. One interesting adaptation of the limited purpose model would combine, or coordinate, welfare allowances, currently administered by the Department of Health and
Human Services, with HUD's existing housing programs. This
approach is, in one respect, the "blockiest" of the block grant
proposals in that it cuts across departmental lines and aggregates
both housing and social service programs. This illustrates again,
the wide range of options available to Congress.
VI. A Host of Considerations for
Congressional Attention

The allocation dilemma and the wide variety of available program options are only two of several critical issues that should be
watched carefully as Congress considers enacting housing block
grant legislation. In addition to the amount of funding and the
method of allocation, key decisions must be made regarding the
nature of the formula to be used to allocate available funds, the
range of policy options recipients will have, the administrative and
fiscal requirements that Congress will impose, and the degree of
support that will be made available for the new housing ventures
designed by recipient jurisdictions. Taken together, these concerns can be grouped and described as follows:
A. How Extensive Will Block
Grant Resources Be?
The cost of housing will not be reduced by the form that federal
housing assistance takes. Advocates of the block grant approach
often contend that increased flexibility will lead to the invention of
more highly leveraged or less expensive methods of meeting the
housing needs of lower income households. Will this contention
lead to a reduction in the overall dollar commitment of the federal
government to housing? If so, will the promises of greater efficiency and innovation of the block grant concept be meaningful in
the face of the increasingly high cost of constructing, rehabilitating, and maintaining housing?
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B . What Type of Financial Authority
Will Be Allocated?
Will Congress make a sufficiently long-term allocation of budget
authority to justify the time and expense involved in gearing up for
the responsibility assumed by recipient jurisdictions? Is that
budget authority, and any restriction on annual contract authority,
geared to allow recipients the full range of housing options available under current programs? If not, what financial and programmatic biases can be found in the method Congress chooses to
allocate budget and contract authority? These biases must be
understood and respected before recipient jurisdictions develop
an administrative structure to assume block grant program responsibility.

C . How Will Block Grant
Resources Be Allocated?
What formula will be used to determine the percent of total block
grant resources that will be allocated to each entitled jurisdiction?
Will the factors used in the formula be limited to poverty and
housing quality-the most fundamental indices of housing needor will they include other factors, such as housing costs and scarcity, population, and renttincome imbalance? Will the resources
be divided between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas?
Will the capacity of recipient jurisdiction figure in the allocation
process? Will a population threshold be used to determine which
localities are entitled to receive funds directly and which must
apply through their states or to HUD for discretionary funds?
Given all these considerations, what level of annual funding is
likely? How many units of housing will that size grant assist in each
locality, given local priorities? Given that level of funding, what
amount of preparation, administrative structure, and commitment
of other resources does the program warrant?

D . What Is the Effective Range of
Policy Options Allowed?
Does the proposed block grant program offer recipient jurisdictions measurably increased flexibility in designing housing programs that respond to local needs? Has Congress included a broad
range of eligible activities, or created instead a limited purpose
program? Will the recipient be obligated to divert a substantial
portion of the funds to honor commitments made by HUD or the
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recipient under pre-existing housing subsidy programs? Has Congress required that funds be targeted primarily to benefit a limited
population group or a defined type of geographical area? How
specifically has Congress defined the federal purposes for which
block grant funds must be expended? How does that definition
compare with local and state priorities?

E . What Degree of Administrative
Control Will HUD Exercise?
How extensive will the application for block grant funds be? Will
HUD have authority to require changes in priorities, programs,
and policy decisions, or will its review be narrower and more
expeditious? Will federal cost and quality standards be imposed on
local projects? What financial management and fiscal control standards will be used? How will Congress require that recipient
jurisdictions comply with other federal statutory and judicial mandates regarding fair housing, affirmative action, environmental
quality, intergovernmental coordination, labor standards and
energy conservation? What type of program reporting and performance review system will HUD use to determine recipient
compliance with minimum federal requirements? What sanctions
will HUD be empowered to use in the event that recipients fail to
comply with these and other criteria?
F . What Other Support Will Be Offered by Congress?
If Congress delegates responsibility for program design to recipient jurisdictions, will it lessen its commitment to providing other
needed assistance? What assistance and guidance will HUD provide to insure that projects receiving block grant funds will be
secure from the long-term risks associated with low-income housing that have been a paramount concern under current HUD
housing programs? What financial support, such as conventional
and long-term financing, mortgage insurance, secondary mortgage
market support, tax incentives, and inducements to states to provide financial assistance will be provided? What technical standards and assistance will HUD provide? Will cost and quality
standards be imposed or recommended? Will management plans
be required, management standards set, and post-occupancy
monitoring performed? Will a federal staff or federal funds be
made available for these and other technical responsibilities that
are proposed to be delegated to recipient jurisdictions?
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VII. The Impact on State and Local
Government of a Shift to a
Housing Block Grant Program

The impact on state and local governments of a shift to a block
grant approach to allocating federal housing assistance will, at a
minimum, be significant; if that shift is to a full-purpose block grant
program, and if most current subsidy programs are eliminated,
that impact will be extreme. To date, the construction and rehabilitation of low- and moderate-income housing has been financed
principally through a limited number of carefully prescribed federal housing programs administered and controlled directly by
HUD. Responsibility for the design of these programs has been
federal; Congress has carefully established priorities for the expenditure of federal housing dollars and has developed a tight
administrative framework for receiving, reviewing and approving
proposals for the commitment of federal housing resources. The
federal bureaucracy has retained direct responsibility for meeting
other national objectives such as fair housing, environmental protection and affirmative action; it is charged with coordinating
housing subsidy programs with the functioning of the all-important
secondary mortgage market and with HUD insurance programs.
The degree to which housing block grant legislation transfers
these current federal responsibilities to the local and state level will
define the impact of such legislation on lower levels of government. The greater the flexibility and control given to states and
municipalities, and the larger the number of federal programs that
are eliminated, the more political, technical and financial responsibility local and state officials will have. Their role will be proportionately increased in establishing priorities, devising methods of
leveraging bank participation, insuring compliance with design
and quality standards, and otherwise monitoring and controlling
private developers. This consideration gives rise to a series of
additional issues that must be seriously examined by Congress if it
considers enacting housing block grant legislation.

A. The Impact of Housing Assistance
Block Grant Legislation on the
State and Local Political Process
A housing block grant program is likely to expand the policy
options available to state and local legislatures in determining what
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housing objectives ought to be met with federal assistance. These
legislators are likely to have more control in deciding whether to
pursue new construction, substantial rehabilitation, housing conservation, or rental assistance programs, and what the mix among
these programs ought to be. They may be given greater latitude by
Congress to decide which households will be eligible for assistance,
and whether to target greater amounts to the elderly, the handicapped, low-income households or minority populations. If some
or all of the current federal housing programs are discontinued,
state and local legislative bodies will be faced with hard decisions
as to whether to use the block grant revenues to continue them. In
the extreme event that public housing modernization funds and
operating subsidies for public housing and troubled federally
assisted projects are folded into the block grant program, legislative leaders must decide whether or how to preserve the integrity
of existing subsidized projects through the use of block grant
funds.
There may be a new level of technical, as well as political,
complexity to the decisions local and state legislators must make. If
state or local laws and ordinances must be passed to create housing
initiatives to replace current federal subsidy programs, then these
legislators will be required to develop considerable expertise in
housing finance and development. They will have to learn the
intricacies of the mortgage market, understand underwriting
criteria, and determine how to create local programs that can take
advantage of innovative mortgage techniques, private mortgage
assistance, tax-exempt financing authorized by state legislation,
and whatever federal insurance and secondary market programs
remain after the block grant program is established.
If Congress were to decide to grant wide discretion to municipalities and states to create new subsidy programs to replace all or a
significant part of the current federally created programs, the
political and technical complexity of the task would be enormous.
This complexity decreases in proportion to the number of federal
programs retained by Congress; it also decreases as the amount of
revenue included in the block grant program declines and the
range of eligible uses for such revenue decreases.
An additional complication overlays this increased political responsibility. A variety of federal statutes and judicial decisions
create standards that must be complied with in spending federal
housing funds. The environmental, fair housing and labor standards, and the affirmative action requirements enforced by HUD
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will not necessarily be affected or diminished by housing block
grant legislation. The much debated site and neighborhood standards, for example, are used by HUD to evaluate the compliance
of Section 8 new construction and substantial rehabilitation projects with established fair housing laws and judicial decisions."
Although other techniques may be devised to comply with these
legislative and judicial criteria, the criteria themselves do not
disappear with the enactment of block grant legislation, for all its
emphasis on local control and flexibility. These additional federally and judicially prescribed standards, then, must also be understood and complied with by recipients in carrying out their block
grant funded housing programs, unless the standards are relaxed
by Congress.
The potential political impact of a housing block grant program
indicates how radically the traditional role of local and state government could be changed in the housing field. Under current
housing subsidy programs, Congress has presented legislators with
a clear statement of federal housing objectives, completely designed federal housing programs, and an administrative structure
to oversee the implementation of federal programs at the state and
local level. Since federal law is relied on in lieu of local and state
law, legislators have been presented with fewer policy choices in
the implementation of housing programs than may be true in the
future.

B . The Legal Impact of
Housing Block Grants
The housing block grant program may create unforeseen legal
problems to the extent that it gives wide discretion for the expenditure of federal assistance to state and local governments. The block
grant concept is based on the philosophical principal of allowing
recipient jurisdictions wide discretion in deciding how to spend
federal assistance. The wider this discretion, the less directive the
31. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 8 245 (1976), requires
that all executive departments and agencies administer their programs relating to
housing in an "affirmative" manner so as to further the objectives of the Title.
This is reinforced by Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibiting discriminatory actions by the federal government. In 1972, following Shannon v. HUD, 436
F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970), H U D established project site selection criteria aimed at
providing minorities with a wide range of housing opportunities. See 24 C.F.R.
Part 200, Subpart N (Project Selection Criteria) (1981). The requirements of Title
VIII and Shannon will have to be respected by Congress and the administration in
adopting and administering successors to the current federal housing programs.
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federal authorizing statutes will be. In many states, local governments have relied on the specificity of federal statutes to authorize
them to spend federal dollars for the purposes of the authorizing
legislation. In the absence of such specific direction, localities may
have to look to state statutes for the legal ability to engage in
housing related activities.
This problem confronted many jurisdictions in the early days of
the Community Development Block Grant Program. Federal law
allowed recipient jurisdictions to give property owners grants, or
low interest loans, to rehabilitate their homes or apartments. State
constitutions and statutes in many states prohibited gifts or loans to
private individuals unless in furtherance of a recognized "public
purpose." The legal definition of public purpose in many states was
simply not broad enough to include the rehabilitation or repair of
privately owned housing unless it was part of an urban renewal
plan or other purpose prescribed by state statutes. Most localities
were able to obtain legal rulings authorizing them to proceed with
their rehabilitation grant and loan programs, based on the detailed
authorization contained in the Housing and Community Development Act and HUD's regulation^.^^ Federal revenue sharing legislation, on the other hand, contains much less specificity as to the
uses to which the shared revenues may be put. These funds must
generally be spent in accordance with the provisions of state and
local finance and municipal law.
A housing block grant program enacted by the current Congress
could very possibly fall somewhere between the fairly specific
Community Development Block Grant program enacted in 1974
and the nonprescriptive federal revenue sharing program. If this is
the case, it may be an open question in many states as to whether
the block grant legislation is specific enough, or whether localities
are narrowly constrained by the spending powers contained in
their state statutes.
C. The Impact of Housing Block Grants
on the Municipal Planning Function
Municipalities that have been receiving Community Development
Block Grants have grown accustomed to preparing Housing
Assistance Plans. The Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974 made the preparation of a Housing Assistance Plan a
prerequisite for receiving Community Development Block
32. See, e.g., Opinion No. 74-1120, State Comptroller of New York (Nov. 1,
1974).
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Grants. It required legislators to articulate the housing needs of
the poor; it provided some assurance that Community Development Block Grant recipients would implement housing, as well as
community development, objectives. Localities were expected to
"take all actions within their control" to implement their housing
assistance plans.33 Such actions included, of course, working
cooperatively with developers and property owners interested in
applying for the separately funded federal subsidy programs. The
legislation also provided that HUD allocate federal subsidy funds;
HUD area offices were authorized to advertise the availability of
units of various forms of subsidy-new construction, substantial
rehabilitation, moderate rehabilitation and existing housingroughly in accordance with the needs for these various programs
spelled out in the housing assistance plans in each allocation area.
If Congress enacts a housing block grant program and eliminates
most or all of the current subsidy programs, much of the rationale
for the housing assistance plan will be removed. Localities are
likely to be allocated a direct dollar amount for a variety of housing
programs; the program mix may be subject to their control rather
than that of the HUD area office. Since many of the same localities
that are entitled to receive community development block grants
may be entitled to receive housing block grants as well, there is
some assurance inherent in the housing block grant concept that
they will be pursuing housing as well as community development
objectives. A modified housing assistance plan might well be required as part of a locality's application for its housing block grant,
as opposed to its community development block grant. This raises
the question of what application and planning requirements Congress is likely to impose on housing block grant applicants. Something akin to the current housing assistance plan may be required if
Congress decides not to streamline greatly the application process,
and to require advance local analysis of the housing stock and the
housing needs of the poor.
On the other hand, there is evidence that Congress might abandon any requirement that localities applying for federal aid prepare and adopt any special housing plan." In this event, the normal
local planning process would be relied on, as supplemented by the
locality, in its discretion, to chart appropriate directions for those
grant assisted housing projects. The local master plan, capital
33. 24 C.F.R. § 570.306(a)(3) (1981).
34. The requirement that applicants for Community Development Block
Grants submit a Housing Assistance Plan was deleted from the Small Cities
Community Development Program in the Fiscal 1982 HUD reauthorization law.
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budget, operating budget, zoning ordinance, building and housing
codes, and other supplemental planning processes would become
the criteria for planning the expenditure of housing block grant
funds.
Ironically, however, a flexible housing block grant may lead to a
greater degree of housing planning at the local level. Given a broad
range of choices for spending funds that are received by local
government, local lenders may insist on more precise housing
needs analyses, market studies, housing condition reports, and
demographic data. It might be decided that the conscientious
exercise of the municipality's additional housing responsibility will
require more reliable information to justify decisions. The desire
of many local officials to be able to account to the public for their
decisions heightens the need for, and should increase local interest
in, professional housing planning.

D . State and Local Administrative and
Technical Capacity and
Housing Block Grants
Perhaps the greatest impact of a shift to housing block grants
would be felt at the level of the line agencies that would be called
upon to design and implement initiatives to replace the eliminated
federal programs. These agencies and their managers and staffs
will bear the initial responsibility for program design and, ultimately, responsibility for program execution. These programs
must face the significant challenge of attracting the participation of
private developers and financial institutions, if they are to leverage
private resources with public funds. They must also reduce the
long-term risk inherent in developing assisted housing to a level
acceptable to the involved political leaders and the private institutions. The extent of this challenge differs markedly, depending on
whether the staff is designing methods of replacing federal new
construction and substantial rehabilitation programs or the moderate scale rehabilitation and rental supplement programs. Where
long-term financing for extremely costly construction and rehabilitation is required, the subsidies must be deeper, more sophisticated, and supported by other insurance, secondary market and
related programs, that are themselves highly complex.
MII. Facing Program Design Issues

The outline of issues below raises many of the critical questions
that must be addressed by state and local officials in designing their
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own housing subsidy progams. The deeper the subsidy and the
longer the term of financing required, the more difficult these
questions will be to answer.
A. Designing Financing Mechanisms
Housing subsidy issues can be divided into two general categories:
availability of mortgage financing and the cost of developing,
financing, and operating housing. Housing subsidy programs must
be designed both to lower the cost of housing and to guarantee the
availability of mortgage credit. Unless the underwriting criteria of
private and public lending institutions are met, cost-reducing subsidy programs will not succeed, because construction financing and
permanent mortgage loans will not be available. These considerations raise four issues that state and local governments would have
to address in deciding how to allocate their housing block grant
resources.
Should the development cost of housing (land, capital improvements, labor materials, overhead, or construction financing) be
written down through a local financial contribution? By reducing
any of the development costs, the final per unit cost will be reduced
as will the amount, and thus the cost, of permanent financing. Is
this the proper focus of block grant assistance? How much would
the price have to be written down to reach the intended target
population?
Should a direct post-occupancy operating subsidy program be
established to reduce the operating and maintenance costs of
housing to the occupant? How deep would the operating subsidy
have to be to reach the intended population?
Should the cost of financing be subsidized? The interest rate
under the old Section 236 program was written down to one
percent to make housing affordable to moderate-income households. To reach low-income households, the government had to
pay a rental supplement, on their behalf, to the owner. Even with
these deep subsidies, countless Section 236 projects went into
default because tenant rents were unable to cover the increased
cost of housing as inflation reached the double-digit level in the
1 9 7 0 ~ At
. ~ ~today's mortgage rates, the cost of subsidizing the

35. See COMPTROLLER
GENERAL
OF THE UNITEDSTATES,
SECTION
236 RENTAL
AN EVALUATION
WITH LESSONSFOR THE FUTURE,REPORT
TO THE
HOUSING:
CONGRESS
(Jan. 10, 1978).
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mortgage interest rate to 1 percent would be double the cost
involved when the Section 236 program was initiated.
Should the availability of financing for housing be the target of
housing block grant expenditures? Local, regional or state governments can establish insurance funds, participation loan programs,
secondary mortgage markets, and a variety of other mechanisms
designed to attract private financing for housing. Perhaps the
major technical issue that officials must address is whether the
state and local governments have the resources and the capacity to
attract private mortgage capital to the projects that they wish to
assist financially. The staff must soberly assess the locality's
chances of success in attracting private financing. Where it is overly
costly or complex to induce mortgage lenders to provide either
construction financing or permanent loans, the locality must then
rely on public or private mortgage insurance, the secondary market, and other supportive programs to make mortgage funds available. Cost cutting subsidy programs must, in turn, be designed to
fit the criteria of these supportive programs.
These four separate techniques can, of course, be used in combination to bring the cost of housing into the range affordable by
the target population. As the technical staff studies methods of
combining subsidy techniques, several questions will inevitably be
raised. Which of the techniques are the most cost-effective in the
short term? What are the cost consequences of each technique
over the long term? What is the exposure to risk? What existing
local, regional, and state programs already exist that can be used to
lower housing costs before using block grant funds? Can tax exempt financing, real estate tax exemption, syndication of tax
advantages, changes in zoning, density bonuses, private mortgage
insurance, the local capital budget, or other resources be used as
the basis for designing a housing block grant program? When all of
these cost reducing techniques are combined, will they be adequate to lower the costs sufficiently to reach low- and moderate-income households? Will they be free enough of risk, and
lucrative enough as investments, to attract mortgage financing
from private or public lending institutions?

B . Development Issues
In addition to designing programs that are financially feasible,
state and iocal technicians must assure that projects assisted by
them are developable. If projects are not profitable and if their
success is not predictable, private developers cannot be induced to
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build and own them. In the alternative, existing nonprofit, quasipublic, or public entities will have to be used, or new ones created,
to develop desired projects. Such entities may have to receive
further public subsidies to do what the private sector will not.
Can the state and local agencies further assist the developer,
whether private, nonprofit, or public, by amending zoning ordinances and revising building and fire codes to allow the use of more
cost-effective, but safe and durable, building products, construction techniques, and design types? Localities can encourage more
cost effective housing design through zoning and code revision.
They can adopt zoning techniques that allow density bonuses to
developers willing to market the bonus units to moderate-income
households. They can perform generic environmental impact
statements and then review and approve preliminary proposals
from developers to cut design and engineering costs. Publicly
owned land can be made available for development, and the public
power of eminent domain, where allowed, can be used to assist
developers with site assemblage. Localities can otherwise act to
foster the level of development desired to fulfill local policy objectives.
Once a developable project is designed, the staff must then
decide how to select a qualified developer, how to monitor that
developer's performance, how to set and insure compliance with
housing standards, how to avoid windfall profits and fraud, and
how to insure that the developer complies with other public objectives regarding, for example, relocation, labor rates, affirmative
action, energy conservation, and environmental protection.

C . Local Administrative Issues
A flexible housing block grant program would bring with it new
opportunities for recipient jurisdictions to coordinate the expenditure of housing block grant funds with its capital and operating
budgets. This, in turn, can facilitate interdepartmental coordination. The need, in many communities, for supportive programs
from regional and state governments may lead to the creation of
new intergovernmental arrangements.
A shift to the direct allocation of federal housing assistance
funds to local governments may lead many communities to become
involved in nontraditional administrative activities and arrangements. This was certainly the result of the Community Development Block Grant Program that was initiated in 1974. That program led to the hiring of rehabilitation specialists, rehabilitation
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finance officers, architects, and housing counselors in communities
that had previously not had such staff positions. In some cases, it
fostered coordination between the community development agencies' activities and those of local housing code bureaus. Community development agencies also began planning public service and
public works programs in conjunction with human resource agencies and public works departments.
To the extent that cities have funded physical development
activities under their community development program, they have
already addressed the major administrative issues which will arise
if they receive block grants for housing. This added resource will,
of course, need to be carefully coordinated with the existing community development program, and administered, as is the community development program, in close coordination with the functions of other city departments and agencies. Social services, tax
assessment administration, permit issuance, zoning planning reviews, capital improvements, and code compliance are all governmental functions that can be used in conjunction with community development programs to support and facilitate housing.
This same opportunity to coordinate housing and community
development programs may now be extended to states which have
heretofore not administered community development programs.
In fiscal year 1982, Congress has given states the option to administer directly the Small Cities Community Development Block
Grant Program. Where states exercise that option, the possibility
exists of close coordination of housing and community development programming at the state level.
Perhaps the greatest potential for administrative change under a
housing block grant program exists in the area of intergovernmental compacts and arrangements. This may be particularly appropriate if a sufficient scale of operations is to be achieved to justify the
cost of creating participation loan programs, complicated bank
pools, mortgage backed security programs, secondary mortgage
markets, and the issuance of tax exempt bonds. Additionally, the
magnitude of the need for public subsidy of new construction and
substantial rehabilitation will inspire a search for all possible
sources of revenue, authority and resources that can be used to
supplement block grant funds to effect affordable housing
strategies. State-local and inter-local arrangements regarding
roads, sewers, sewage treatment, water supply, public transit,
social service, and other public services and improvements may be
essential to the success of assisted housing strategies.
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IX. Housing Allowances and
Cash Transfer Payments

With modest exceptions, HUD historically has administered programs aimed at increasing or improving the supply of housing for
the poor. To encourage developers to build, and landlords to
rehabilitate housing for low-income households, Congress provided that subsidies would be paid directly to the project owner
and attach to the housing units subsidized. The guarantee of subsidy payments, secured by a contract between the owner and
HUD, was designed to enable owners to obtain financing to build
or rehabilitate residential buildings. Eligible tenants could come
and go over the life of the contract, benefiting from reasonably
priced housing built or rehabilitated to meet property standards
defined by HUD.
Housing allowances, in contrast, are designed to bolster the
demand for.housing. They are typically paid to eligible tenants in
the form of a cash transfer payment designated specifically for
meeting shelter costs. HUD has administered three programs that
moved in the direction of housing allowances. Two such programs
were created in 1965. Under the Housing and Urban Development
Act of that year, Congress created the Rent Supplement and
Section 23 Leased Housing Program, both of which tied subsidies
to the incomes of eligible tenants." The Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974 established the Section 8 Existing Program, which also utilized an income related subsidy to be paid on
behalf of eligible occupants of existing, standard housing units.37
None of these programs, however, involved direct payments of
housing allowances to the assisted household. They relied on
intermediaries, the local public housing agency or project owner,
to receive and administer the funds.
Congress had stopped short of legislating a housing allowance
program, with subsidies to be paid directly to low-income families,
for a variety of reasons. It was feared that allowances would be
difficult to administer, would artificially inflate housing prices and
would be used to pay for, and thus subsidize, substandard housing.
It was also thought that allowances would have no perceptible
effect on the supply of housing for the poor. The perceived benefits
of the housing allowance approach were several. It was seen as less
expensive, on a per unit basis, than providing newly constructed or
36. See notes 20 and 21 supra and accompanying text.
37. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 supra note 27.
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substantially rehabilitated housing to the poor. If properly managed, it might be used to encourage better maintenance of older
housing. To some, it was thought more equitable to spread housing
subsidy dollars broadly through an allowance program, than to
reward a fortunate few with costly new and rehabilitated units.
In the late 1960s the President's Commission on Urban Housing,
popularly called the Kaiser Commission, reviewed the housing
allowance debate and recommended the initiation of an ex'~
thereafperimental program to test the concept f ~ r t h e r . Shortly
ter, Congress authorized HUD to establish the Experimental
Housing Allowance Program (EHAP) .39 After a decade of experimentation, several conclusions have been reached about housing
allowances, as tested under three separate EHAP programs.@
HUD has determined that 20 percent of all United States households have incomes that make them eligible for a housing allowance program. Under the allowance experiment, it was found that
a majority of the eligible households lived in substandard housing;
most had high rent burdens. Participation in the experimental
programs was generally high among most income and ethnic
groups, when the program was administered without housing standards. When housing standards were introduced as a program
requirement, participation declined markedly. More stringent
housing standards disproportionately reduced the participation of
minority families, large households, and poorer people. Predictably, the poorer the quality of the dwelling unit, the less likely the
household occupying it is to participate. If housing standards are
eliminated, participation levels increase, but about two-thirds of
the households receiving the allowance will live in substandard
housing. As the level of payment increases, so does participation.
On the average, the allowance program costs $1,150 per household
in 1974 dollars: $900 for allowances and $250 for administration.
HUD concluded that allowances do not artificially inflate the price
of housing, nor do they stimulate the construction or major repair
of housing for the poor.
Based on these conclusions, it may be fairly stated that housing
allowances are, at best, only a partial response to the housing
38. A DECENT
HOME,THEREPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMITTEE
ON URBAN
HOUSING
14 (1969).
39. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-609, $504,
84 Stat. 1770, 1784 (1971).
HOUSING
ALLOWANCE
PROGRAM,
CONCLUSIONS:
THE1980
40. EXPERIMENTAL
REPORT
(February, 1980).
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problems of low-income households. Where the supply of housing
is inadequate, where deterioration is widespread, and where costs
are particularly high, the allowance approach is simply not enough
to redress the major shelter needs of the poor. If housing standards
are not used, participation will be acceptable, but public funds will
be used to subsidize substandard housing. If decent, safe, and
sanitary conditions are required, participation among the occupants of substandard housing will decline markedly. In either
event, allowances are not deep enough to cause the market to
increase the supply of housing for the poor.
X. Cash Transfer Payments

As HUD and Congress continue to experiment with the provision
of housing allowances directly to the poor, they begin to obscure
the difference between the housing programs administered by
HUD and the cash transfer, or welfare, programs administered by
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). National
welfare policy has been directed to a variety of objectives discernible as early as 1909 in the While House Conference on Children.
One of these objectives is aiming federal aid at maintaining a
suitable home for the rearing of children. Federal social welfare
legislation has consistently provided for the provision of "maintenance services" designed to help recipients sustain or strengthen
family life and to restore them to a condition of self-support or
self-care. Taxpayer groups have favored programs and policies
that discourage households from obtaining or continuing on relief.
In recent years, it has become an overt purpose of Congress to
reduce social service expenditures by getting people off the welfare
rolls. This objective was to be achieved by a variety of techniques,
including the provision of "developmental services" and the creation of job incentive programs both designed to help recipients
achieve self-support and to reduce their dependency on the government. Social work philosophy also favors recipient selfdetermination out of a motivation to see less reliance on the public
sector and greater personal growth and responsibility within the
family unit.
Out of this emphasis on self-dependency evolved the "money
payment principle," which is a landmark in social legislation. The
Social Security Act, passed in 1935," established the categorical
--

41. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1936).
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assistance benefit as a money payment to be made directly, without
restriction, to the eligible recipient. The assumption is that financial need does not abrogate the individual's right and responsibility
to handle money to which he or she is entitled by reason of his or
her needy status. Although the Social Security Act has been
amended on many occasions, the unrestricted money payment is
still the controlling principle behind the federal system of public
assistance. This principle applies, of course, to the payment of
rent. With limited exceptions, recipients must be unfettered in
their right and responsibility to utilize their grants to pay rent and
their other expenses of living.
The money payment principle has prevented departments of
social services from responding to suggestions by landlords that
additional housing would be opened up to recipients, and better
quality housing provided, if payments on behalf of recipients were
made directly to the owners. Recent efforts to widen the departments' direct payment authority have been thwarted by legal services attorneys and representatives of recipients who argue that
direct payments markedly lessen the landlord's incentive to provide services and make repairs, and limit the freedom of recipients
to take effective recourse when services and repairs are not provided.
HHS's unrestricted payment approach provides assistance to
recipients at or below the minimum standard of living. Recipients
are subject to the private market where they negotiate rentals with
only those landlords who can afford to operate their buildings at
the rent levels that recipients can pay. This frequently results in
recipient families paying up to 50 percent of their incomes for
shelter. Further, there are virtually no administrative mechanisms
in place to insure that the shelter purchased provides a suitable
home.
Despite the fact that billions of public dollars flow into the
housing markets under HHS cash transfer programs, the words
"shelter" and "housing" are singularly absent from the social
security legislation drafted over the years by the congressional
committees that design HHS's programs and appropriate funds for
their implementation. The deliberations of those critical committees are uncluttered and uninfluenced by the representatives of
builders, banks, neighborhood organizations, tenant organizations, public housing authorities, and community development
agencies. Instead, the attention of housing lobbyists is riveted on
the activities of those separate housing, banking, and urban affairs
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committees where national housing policy is made and programs
to realize the elusive statutory goal of "a.decent home and suitable
living environment for every American family" are conceived and
given birth.
In the years ahead, these congressional housing committees
must confront the increasingly popular notion of reducing federal
expenditures by increasing HUD7s reliance on housing allowances. As they do, they will face a dilemma of significant proportions. They will be called upon to distinguish the HUD housing
allowance from the HHS cash transfer payment, much of which is
used to pay for shelter for welfare families. The distinction, of
course, rests on HUD7shistorical commitment to a "decent home
for all Americans." This commitment, in turn, will create great
pressure to tie housing allowances to housing standards. The
EHAP experiment, however, shows that such a link drastically
reduces participation among those most in need of housing assistance. This, then, argues for increasing the level of the allowance
which, EHAP tells us, tends to increase participation. But, to
increase allowance levels is to place a greater financial burden on
the federal treasury. Since the high cost of housing programs was
what began the reexamination of federal housing policy in the first
instance, such a result may be unacceptable. One option is to
reduce the number of households eligible for the housing allowance program. If this is achieved by lowering the income limits, the
households eligible for HUD7shousing allowance program may be
nearly indistinguishable from those receiving living and shelter
allowances from HHS. The temptation, in the current political
climate, to celebrate that result by simply eliminating HUD subsidy programs for the poor may be too great to resist.
XI. New Generation of Federal Housing Programs

The Supreme Court in Helvering and Fullilove silenced all echoes
of the debate among the founders over the extent to which Congress was empowered to tax and spent in the national interest.
Fullilove was decided in 1980, just as the debate over the extent to
which the federal fisc should be relied on to solve social problems
reached a crescendo. With the election of Ronald Reagan and the
advent of supply-side economic theory, the broad spending powers
that Congress is now recognized to possess seem destined, at least
for a time, to be exercised much less vigorously in pursuing the goal
of a decent home for all Americans. Alexander Hamilton had
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argued persuasively for a broad interpretation of the general welfare clause. Yet, he would have understood this result. On the
power to tax he wrote:
There is no part of the administration of government that requires extensive
information and a thorough knowledge of the principles of political economy so
much as the business of taxation. The man who understands these principles
best will be least likely to resort to aggressive expedients, or to sacrifice any
particular class of citizens to the procurement of revenue. It might be demonstrated that the most productive system of finance will always be the least
burdensome."

The decision to reduce federal spending for housing in the
current fiscal year, by nearly 50 percent, was part of the general
reaction to double digit inflation, precipitated in significant part by
federal borrowing to finance the budget deficit, and for loans to,
and sponsored by, the federal government. In the decade prior to
the inauguration of President Reagan, the amount of annual borrowing for these purposes increased from $33.5 billion to $156.9
billion. "Taxes, like necessity," Hume wrote, "when carried too
far, destroy industry by engendering despair; . . . . An attentive,
disinterested legislature will observe the point when the emolument ceases and the prejudice begins."43
That point has apparently been reached for the Congress, the
Secretary of HUD, and the President's Housing Commission.
Their recent actions bespeak less federal spending for housing,
greater reliance on the private market for solutions, and more use
of direct assistance to those in need. In forwarding his Interim
Report to the President, Chairman McKenna of the Housing
Commission wrote, "We support your commitment to control the
growth of government spending and your determination to arrest
the pace of government spending which fuels the fires of inflation
and high interest rates-common enemies of a truly healthy housing market. ""
The Commission recommended that the "primary federal program for helping low-income families achieve decent housing be a
consumer-oriented housing assistance grant."" The Commission
proposed that this housing allowance approach replace new construction programs entirely, that eligibility be limited to "households with very low incomes," and that recipients "should be
42. THEFEDERALIST
NO. 35 (A. Hamilton).
43. D. HUME,OF TAXES.
44. THEPRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION
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45. Id. at 6.
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required to live in decent housing in order to qualify for
assistance. . . ."46 Recognizing that housing allowances do not
increase the supply of housing, the Commission stated its belief
that a new federal housing policy should include "reliance on the
experience and flexibility of state and local agencies to finance and
produce housing, including both rehabilitation and new
constr~ction."~~
The report also adopts the "trickledown" theory
of housing occupancy. It suggests that its recommendations which
serve to increase housing supply for middle- and upper-income
Americans will enable the poor to find and afford better housing.
HUD, which provided staff assistance to the President's Housing Commission, endorsed the Commission's emphasis on housing
allowances in submitting its budget proposals for fiscal year 1983 to
the Office of Management and Budget in October of 1981.'@The
HUD proposal seeks an additional thirty percent cut in funding for
housing assistance, and places nearly exclusive emphasis on subsidies for existing housing. HUD proposed a housing voucher
program involving a direct subsidy payment to individuals as the
cornerstone of future federal housing assistance to lower income
households. Only 10,000 units of new construction would be
assisted--down 93 percent from the fiscal year 1981 program. The
voucher program would have to meet housing standards and eligibility would be limited to households with very low incomes.
HUD also proposed a $200 billion housing rehabilitation
block grant program which would be supported by a 40,000 unit
set-aside of housing vouchers. This represents the first serious and
formal proposal to initiate a housing block grant program since the
1976 Hills proposal. The Hills proposal was a long-term, fullpurpose block grant program; it contrasts markedly with the current HUD recommendation which is patterned after the shortterm, limited purpose model.
XII. Conclusion

These proposals represent an abrupt change in the course of federal housing policy. For four and a half decades the trend was to
spend larger and larger sums of money on a variety of programs.
These initiatives were built on the belief that achieving decent
46. Id.
47. Id. at 5.
48. See note 4, supra.
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housing for the poor required highly prescriptive federal programs
to increase the supply of newly constructed and substantially rehabilitated housing. Proposals being given serious consideration in
Washington today represent an entirely new generation of thought
about the role of the federal government in housing. The shift in
emphasis to subsidizing existing housing, providing housing allowances directly to the poor, and transferring resources and responsibility to state and local governments may mark the end of the
expansive use of the federal spending power for low-income housing. It may also herald the beginning of a new succession of
experiments that rely much less on the Article I, Section 8 tax and
spending powers over which Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson
argued so strenuously. As a new era of federal housing policy
begins, the debate will center not on the extent of the federal
spending power, but rather on the extent to which that power
ought to be exercised to assure adequate shelter for needy Americans.
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